Sub-topics: Change in British attitude (1945) · 1945–46 elections · INA trials · Three upsurges incl. RIN mutiny · Cabinet Mission Plan · Direct Action · Interim Government · Growth of communalism & the two-nation theory.
1. Two strands of the last two years (1945–47)2. Why the British attitude changed (1945)3. Elections campaign and the INA trials ⭐⭐Congress supportWhy the INA agitation was a landmark4. Three upsurges of winter 1945–46 ⭐⭐Royal Indian Navy revolt (18–23 February 1946) ⭐⭐Three-stage pattern of all upsurgesSignificance and limits5. Election results (1945–46) ⭐6. The Cabinet Mission (March–June 1946) ⭐⭐⭐Why British withdrawal now looked imminentThe Plan (16 May 1946)Interpretations and objections7. Communal holocaust and the Interim GovernmentInterim Government — sworn in 2 September 1946 ⭐8. Birth and spread of communalism ⭐Three stages of communal ideologyReasons for growthEvolution of the two-nation theory — timeline🧠 Memory box🎯 Exam traps
1. Two strands of the last two years (1945–47)
- Tortuous negotiations among the government, Congress and League, with growing communal violence, ending in freedom with partition.
- Sporadic, localised, militant mass action by workers, peasants and states’ people — a strike wave: INA release movement, RIN revolt, Tebhaga, Worli revolt, Punjab Kisan Morchas, Travancore (Punnapra–Vayalar), Telangana.
2. Why the British attitude changed (1945)
- Leaders released (June 1945) found crowds impatient for action, not demoralised.
- July 1945: Labour government — PM Clement Attlee, Secretary of State Pethick-Lawrence.
- Aug 1945: elections to central and provincial assemblies announced; Sept 1945: a Constituent Assembly to be convened after elections, in the spirit of the Cripps Offer.
Reasons:
- Global power shift — UK no longer a great power; USA and USSR (both pro-Indian freedom) emerged as superpowers.
- Labour government more sympathetic.
- Socialist-radical wave in Europe.
- War-weary British soldiers; shattered economy (Britain owed India £1.2 billion; drained by US Lend-Lease).
- Anti-imperialist wave in SE Asia (Vietnam, Indonesia).
- Fear of a 1942-type revolt, now more dangerous (communications, agrarian revolts, labour, army disaffection, INA men).
- Elections due (last held 1934 centre, 1937 provinces). Labour only quickened an inevitable retreat.
3. Elections campaign and the INA trials ⭐⭐
- Elections held in winter 1945–46. Congress campaign aimed to mobilise against the British, not just win votes: glorified 1942 martyrs, condemned officials, promised inquiries and punishment — demoralising the services.
- INA trials — “the edge of a volcano”: British planned public trials of hundreds, dismissal and detention of ~7,000. First trial at the Red Fort, Delhi (Nov 1945) put together a Hindu, a Muslim and a Sikh — Prem Kumar Sehgal, Shah Nawaz Khan, Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon.
- Also anger at Indian troops used to restore French and Dutch rule in Vietnam and Indonesia.
Congress support
- First post-war session (Bombay, Sept 1945) passed a strong pro-INA resolution.
- Defence counsel: Bhulabhai Desai (lead), Tej Bahadur Sapru, Kailash Nath Katju, Jawaharlal Nehru (wore barrister’s robes after 25 years), Asaf Ali.
- INA Relief and Enquiry Committee; fund collection.
Why the INA agitation was a landmark
- Unprecedented intensity and publicity: editorials, pamphlets (even threats of revenge), graffiti, meetings, INA Day (12 Nov 1945) and INA Week (5–11 Nov).
- Wide spread: nerve centres Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, UP towns, Punjab; even Coorg, Baluchistan, Assam. Donors from film stars to tongawallas, gurdwaras, municipal committees, Indians abroad; AIWC demanded release.
- Supported by almost everyone: Muslim League, Communists, Unionists, Akalis, Justice Party, Ahrars, RSS, Hindu Mahasabha, Sikh League.
- Reached the Raj’s bulwarks — government employees, loyalist title-holders, armed forces personnel.
- Became a question of Britain’s right to decide an Indian matter — “India vs Britain”.
- Result: sentences on the first three remitted (Jan 1946, C-in-C Auchinleck); only those accused of murder/brutality to be tried.
4. Three upsurges of winter 1945–46 ⭐⭐
Date | Place | Trigger |
21 Nov 1945 | Calcutta | INA trials — students (Forward Bloc, SFI, Islamia College; League and Congress flags tied together) marched to Dalhousie Square; firing, 2 dead |
11 Feb 1946 | Calcutta | 7-year sentence to INA officer Abdul Rashid Ali; led by League students with Congress and Communist students |
18 Feb 1946 | Bombay | RIN mutiny |
Royal Indian Navy revolt (18–23 February 1946) ⭐⭐
- ~1,100 ratings of HMIS Talwar (signals training ship) struck against: racial discrimination (equal pay with whites), bad food, abuse by officers, arrest of rating B.C. Dutt for scrawling “Quit India” on the ship, the INA trials, and use of Indian troops in Indonesia.
- Hoisted tricolour, crescent and hammer-and-sickle flags together on the rebel fleet; drove around Bombay in lorries with Congress flags; crowds brought food. Naval Central Strike Committee led by M.S. Khan.
Three-stage pattern of all upsurges
- A group defies authority and is repressed;
- City people join — virtual paralysis of Calcutta and Bombay (hartals, attacks on Europeans, police stations, trams, banks; barricades);
- Sympathy elsewhere — student hartals; strikes in military establishments at Karachi, Madras, Visakhapatnam, Calcutta, Delhi, Cochin, Jamnagar, Andamans, Bahrain, Aden; RIAF strikes at Bombay, Poona, Calcutta, Jessore, Ambala.
- Patel and Jinnah persuaded the ratings to surrender on 23 Feb 1946, promising no victimisation. (Aruna Asaf Ali supported them; Gandhi criticised the mutiny as ill-advised — if for India’s freedom it was doubly wrong; they should have waited for leaders.)
Significance and limits
- Fearless mass action; revolt in the armed forces had a liberating effect; RIN revolt seen as marking the end of British rule.
- Concessions: only those INA men accused of murder/brutality to be tried; first batch’s sentences remitted (Jan 1947); Indian troops withdrawn from Indo-China and Indonesia (Feb 1947); parliamentary delegation (Nov 1946) and Cabinet Mission decided (Jan 1946).
- Limits: violent, so only militant sections joined; short-lived, urban; unity was organisational (Muslim ratings went to the League, others to Congress/Socialists); repressive machinery still intact (a Maratha battalion rounded up the ratings).
- Congress strategy: did not officially support them because of timing and tactics — negotiation was due as the British were preparing to leave. (Leftists accuse Congress of fearing loss of control and wanting a disciplined army in free India.)
5. Election results (1945–46) ⭐
ㅤ | Congress | Muslim League |
Votes | 91% of non-Muslim votes | 86.6% of Muslim votes |
Central Assembly | 57 of 102 seats | All 30 Muslim seats |
Provinces | Majority in most, incl. NWFP and Assam (claimed for Pakistan); not in Bengal, Sindh, Punjab | Majority in Bengal and Sindh; now dominant among Muslims (unlike 1937) |
- Punjab: Unionist–Congress–Akali coalition under Khizr Hayat Khan.
- Communal voting (vs anti-British unity in upsurges) because of separate electorates and limited franchise (<10% for provinces, <1% for the centre).
6. The Cabinet Mission (March–June 1946) ⭐⭐⭐
- Announced February 1946 by Attlee; members: Pethick-Lawrence (Secretary of State, chairman), Stafford Cripps (President, Board of Trade), A.V. Alexander (First Lord of the Admiralty). Reached Delhi 24 March 1946.
- Attlee (15 March 1946): Britain “cannot allow a minority to place their veto on the advance of the majority” — contrast with Wavell at Shimla.
Why British withdrawal now looked imminent
- Nationalism had won the struggle for hegemony, reaching untouched areas.
- Bureaucracy no longer British-dominated (Indianisation; British–Indian parity in ICS by 1939); depleted, war-weary.
- Conciliation–repression strategy exhausted (after Cripps only full freedom was left to offer; repression exposed naked force; leniency looked weak; loyalists dismayed).
- Congress ministries had boosted morale.
- INA sympathy in the army and the RIN revolt cast doubt on the forces’ reliability.
- Purely official rule impossible — not enough officials.
- A settlement needed to bury the ghost of mass movement and secure good future relations. Wavell (Oct 1946): “Our time in India is limited and our power to control events almost gone.”
The Plan (16 May 1946)
- Rejected a full-fledged Pakistan: it would contain large non-Muslim minorities (38% NW, 48% NE); the same logic would demand separation of Hindu-majority west Bengal and Sikh/Hindu Ambala and Jullundur divisions; partition of Bengal and Punjab would break regional ties; economic/administrative problems (two wings far apart); dividing the armed forces dangerous.
- Grouping of provinces into three sections:
- A: Madras, Bombay, CP, UP, Bihar, Orissa (Hindu-majority);
- B: Punjab, NWFP, Sindh (Muslim-majority);
- C: Bengal, Assam (Muslim-majority).
- Three-tier executive and legislature: province, section, union.
- Constituent Assembly of 389: 292 from provincial assemblies (elected by proportional representation in three groups — General, Muslim, Sikh), 4 from Chief Commissioner’s provinces, 93 from princely states. (Democratic, no weightage.)
- Sections to sit separately to frame provincial (and group) constitutions; then the whole CA for the Union constitution.
- Union centre limited to defence, communications, external affairs; federal structure.
- Communal questions in central legislature by a majority of both communities present and voting.
- Provinces: full autonomy and residual powers.
- Princely states freed from British paramountcy; free to deal with successor governments or Britain.
- A province could leave a group after the first general elections; after 10 years could call for reconsideration of group/union constitution.
- Meanwhile an interim government from the CA.
Interpretations and objections
Congress | Muslim League |
Grouping optional; one CA; League had no veto → Pakistan rejected | Grouping compulsory; sections B and C would develop into Pakistan (Mission later said grouping was compulsory) |
Provinces should be free not to join a group at the start (thinking of Congress-ruled NWFP and Assam); compulsory grouping violates provincial autonomy; princes’ nominees not acceptable | Hoped Congress would reject so it would be invited to form the interim government |
- Acceptance: League 6 June 1946; Congress 24 June 1946 (long-term plan).
- July 1946: CA elections by provincial assemblies (Congress 208, League 73 of the 296 British India seats).
- 10 July 1946: Nehru (as Congress president) — “We are not bound by a single thing except… to go into the Constituent Assembly”; grouping would probably not happen.
- 29 July 1946: League withdrew acceptance; called for “Direct Action” from 16 August 1946 to achieve Pakistan.
Wavell’s “Breakdown Plan” (May 1946) — a middle course between “repression” and “scuttle”: withdraw British army and officials to the Muslim provinces of the NW and NE and hand the rest to the Congress. Superseded, but showed (i) Britain knew it couldn’t suppress another Congress rebellion; (ii) some wished to make Pakistan a “Northern Ireland”.
7. Communal holocaust and the Interim Government
- From 16 August 1946 (Direct Action Day) — “Great Calcutta Killings”; riots spread to Bombay, Noakhali (Oct 1946), Bihar 🟣 (Oct–Nov 1946, retaliatory), Garhmukteshwar (UP). Gandhi walked through Noakhali and later toured Bihar (March 1947).
- Wavell now wanted Congress in the government even without the League — reversing the Shimla stance (continuing rule needed one posture; withdrawal and post-imperial links another).
Interim Government — sworn in 2 September 1946 ⭐
Congress-dominated, headed by Nehru (as Vice-President of the Executive Council); still essentially the old executive (Wavell overruled ministers on INA releases in his last cabinet, March 1947). League joined on 26 October 1946 — without giving up Direct Action, despite rejecting the Cabinet plans, and insisting on compulsory grouping.
Member | Portfolio |
Jawaharlal Nehru | Vice-President of Executive Council; External Affairs & Commonwealth Relations |
Vallabhbhai Patel | Home; Information & Broadcasting |
Baldev Singh | Defence |
John Mathai | Industries & Supplies (later Finance→Railways) |
C. Rajagopalachari | Education |
C.H. Bhabha | Works, Mines & Power |
Rajendra Prasad 🟣 | Food & Agriculture |
Jagjivan Ram 🟣 | Labour |
Asaf Ali | Railways |
Liaqat Ali Khan (League) | Finance |
I.I. Chundrigar (League) | Commerce |
Abdur Rab Nishtar (League) | Communications |
Ghazanfar Ali Khan (League) | Health |
Jogendra Nath Mandal (League nominee, Scheduled Caste) | Law |
League’s obstruction: boycotted the Constituent Assembly (first met 9 Dec 1946; Nehru moved the Objectives Resolution on 13 Dec 1946); refused informal cabinet meetings; questioned Congress ministers’ decisions; Liaqat’s budget (“poor man’s budget”, Feb 1947) hampered other ministries and hit Congress-supporting businessmen. A foothold to fight for Pakistan — “civil war by other means”. Feb 1947: nine Congress ministers demanded the League’s exit; League demanded dissolution of the CA — crisis.
8. Birth and spread of communalism ⭐
Three stages of communal ideology
- Communal nationalism — followers of a religion share the same secular interests.
- Liberal communalism — different religions have different secular (economic, political, cultural) interests (till ~1937: safeguards, reservations).
- Extreme communalism — interests are incompatible; communities cannot co-exist (after 1937; based on fear, hatred, violence).
It is a modern phenomenon born of mass politics; social roots in the rising middle class; backed by colonial administration; aided by overlap of class and religious distinctions; supported by conservative elements.
Reasons for growth
- Socio-economic: Muslims lagged in modern education, trade and industry → landlords and reactionaries retained influence; educated Muslims depended on government jobs; British and loyalists (Syed Ahmed Khan) set educated Muslims against Hindus; acute unemployment → demands for communal reservation. (Nehru: a generation’s lag between Hindu and Muslim middle classes produced fear.)
- Divide and rule: after 1857 and Wahabis, Muslims were suspected; after the 1870s the British reversed course to rally Muslims against nationalism (Syed Ahmed Khan).
- Communal history-writing (ancient = Hindu, medieval = Muslim period).
- Side-effects of reform movements (Wahabi, Shuddhi).
- Side-effects of militant nationalism (Ganapati/Shivaji festivals, anti-cow-slaughter, Hindu symbols; Lucknow Pact’s and Khilafat’s communal element). Earlier, Dadabhai (1886) kept socio-religious issues out; Congress (1889) resolved not to take up issues opposed by Muslims.
- Majority communalism: Hindi–Urdu issue; Punjab Hindu Sabha (1909) — U.N. Mukherji, Lal Chand; All-India Hindu Mahasabha first session April 1915 (Maharaja of Kasim Bazar); RSS (1925).
Evolution of the two-nation theory — timeline
Year | Step |
1887–88 | Dufferin and UP Lt-Governor Colvin attacked Congress; Syed Ahmed Khan and Raja Shiv Prasad propped up as an anti-Congress front |
1906 | Simla Deputation (Aga Khan) → Minto’s assurance; Muslim League founded |
1909 | Separate electorates (Morley-Minto); Punjab Hindu Sabha |
1915 | First Hindu Mahasabha session |
1916 | Lucknow Pact — Congress accepted separate electorates (legitimised League) |
1920s | Riots; Shuddhi and Sangathan (Arya Samaj) vs Tabligh and Tanzeem; Responsivists joined Mahasabha; Ali brothers turned against Congress |
1928–29 | Nehru Report opposed; Jinnah’s 14 Points |
1930–34 | Weak Muslim role in CDM (except Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, Khudai Khidmatgars); communalists at all three RTCs |
1932 | Communal Award accepted all 14-point communal demands |
1933 | Choudhary Rahmat Ali coined “Pakistan” (Iqbal had earlier, 1930 Allahabad League session, spoken of a NW Muslim state) |
1937–39 | After poor results, League turned to extreme communalism; Jinnah demanded Congress call itself Hindu and recognise the League as sole Muslim representative |
1940 | Lahore Resolution (24 March) |
1940–46 | Virtual veto via August Offer, Cripps, Shimla, Cabinet Mission |
1947 | Pakistan: Muslim-majority areas of Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, NWFP, Bengal |
Mistakes of Congress in negotiating with the League: legitimised the League and the idea of separate communities; undermined nationalist Muslims; concessions to one invited demands from others; made an all-out attack on communalism difficult.
Maulana Mohammad Ali: “We divide and they rule.” · Gandhi: the majority–minority question is a British creation. · Aga Khan: Pakistan “was born in the Muslim University of Aligarh”. · Tilak: alienness is about interests, not skin or religion.
🧠 Memory box
- Upsurge dates: 21 Nov 1945 · 11 Feb 1946 · 18 Feb 1946 (RIN, HMIS Talwar); surrender 23 Feb (Patel + Jinnah).
- INA Red Fort trio: Sehgal (Hindu), Shah Nawaz (Muslim), Dhillon (Sikh); defence led by Bhulabhai Desai.
- Cabinet Mission: “PCA” = Pethick-Lawrence, Cripps, Alexander; plan 16 May 1946; CA 389 = 292 + 4 + 93; Groups A-B-C.
- 1946: 6 June League yes → 24 June Congress yes → 10 July Nehru’s remark → 29 July League no → 16 Aug Direct Action → 2 Sept Interim Govt → 26 Oct League joins → 9 Dec CA meets → 13 Dec Objectives Resolution.
🎯 Exam traps
- ⚠️ Cabinet Mission rejected Pakistan but its compulsory grouping looked like a back door to it.
- ⚠️ Bihar was in Group A; Assam in Group C with Bengal; NWFP in Group B.
- ⚠️ In the Interim Government, Liaqat Ali Khan held Finance; Jogendra Nath Mandal (League nominee) held Law.
- ⚠️ Congress did not officially support the RIN revolt; Patel (and Jinnah) persuaded surrender.
- ⚠️ League won all 30 Muslim seats in the Central Assembly (1946).